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I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike other topics that are the subject of heated debate among
legal academics, state preemption of local government health and
safety measures can literally be a matter of life and death. A glaring
example can be found during the current COVID-19 pandemic.
Local measures designed to prevent or slow the spread of the virus
initially went hand-in-hand with complementary state controls, and
some governors allowed localities to be more (but not less) protective
of public health and safety. For example, in his original stay-athome order, Illinois Governor JB Pritzker provided that “[n]othing
in this Executive Order shall, in any way, alter or modify any
existing legal authority allowing a county or local government body
to enact provisions that are stricter than those in this Executive
Order.”1
In other instances, as more circumspect state officers finally
acted, they also sought to rein in existing local protective measures
they deemed unnecessary. For example, as noted by Professor
Sheila Foster, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp “signed an Executive
Order superseding any previous local ‘shelter-in-place’ order,
effectively reopening beaches that had been closed under those

*
Richard E. Nelson Eminent Scholar Chair in Local Government, University of
Florida Levin College of Law. The author thanks his fellow participants in the Local
Auxtonomy and Energy Law Symposium from whom he gained much knowledge and
inspiration, and particularly the host who made it possible, Professor Hannah Wiseman, who
with the author and Professor John Nolon, fancy themselves to be the Athos, Porthos, and
Aramis of land use law. Matt Geiger and Paul Pakidis provided expert guidance.
Conversations with Tom Ankersen and Dennis Calfee helped sharpen the arguments; any
dullness is the author’s responsibility.
1. Ill. Exec. Order No. 20-10 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/
Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-10.aspx.
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previous orders.”2 Alan Wilson, the Attorney General of South
Carolina, was asked by state representative Jeff Bradley, “Do the
Governor’s extraordinary powers in a state of emergency preempt
similar orders of counties and municipalities during the same state
of emergency?”3 Wilson answered that a “local government cannot
exercise the emergency powers delegated to the Governor by the
General Assembly,” which meant that “counties and municipalities
should be aware that any unauthorized exercise of such emergency
powers could subject these political subdivisions to liability at the
behest of a private citizen with requisite legal standing.”4
After states began to lift their restrictions, and as infection
numbers and rates began to climb to alarming levels, measures such
as mandatory mask-wearing and social distancing, as well as the reimposition of restrictions on non-essential business, became highly
politicized, and the tension between state and local officials in
several states became more acute. When, for example, Atlanta
Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms announced a return to pre-spike stayat-home restrictions, Governor Kemp responded via the twenty-first
century’s message medium of choice for embattled politicians—
Twitter—and stated that Mayor Bottoms’ order was “‘merely
guidance—both non-binding and legally unenforceable . . . . As
clearly stated in my executive orders, no local action can be more or
less restrictive, and that rule applies statewide.’”5

2. Sheila R. Foster, As COVID-19 Proliferates Mayors Take Response Lead, Sometimes
in Conflicts with Their Governors, THE GEORGETOWN PROJECT ON STATE AND LOCAL POLICY
AND
LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/salpal/as-covid-19-proliferates-mayors-takeresponse-lead-sometimes-in-conflicts-with-their-governors/ (last visted Sept. 29, 2020); See
Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (“[T]he powers of counties and cities . . . are
hereby suspended to the extent of suspending enforcement of any local ordinance or order
adopted or issued since Mar. 1, 2020, with the stated purpose or effect of responding to a
public health state of emergency, ordering residents to shelter-in-place, ordering a
quarantine, or combatting the spread of coronavirus or COVID-19 that in any ways conflicts,
varies, or differs from the terms of this Order.”).
3. Letter from Alan Wilson, Att’y Gen., S.C., to Jeff Bradley, State Rep., S.C. H.R., at
1 (Mar. 29, 2020), http://2hsvz0l74ah31vgcm16peuy12tz.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/COVID-opinion-on-extraordinary-powers-with-additional-citations02245943xD2C78.pdf (concerning the extraordinary powers of the Governor during a state of
emergency based upon a new declaration of emergency dated Mar. 28, 2020).
4. Id. at 5.
5. Scott Neuman, Georgia Governor and the Mayor of Atlanta in Turf War over
COVID-19 Restrictions, NPR (July 10, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2020/07/10/889930319/georgia-governor-and-the-mayor-of-atlanta-in-turf-war-overcovid-19-restrictions (quoting a Tweet from Governor Brian Kemp on July 10, 2020); See Ga.
Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, at 25 (Apr. 23, 2020) (“[E]nforcement of any county or municipal
ordinance or order that is more or less restrictive than this Order is hereby suspended.”);
Press Release, Keisha Lance Bottoms, Mayor of Atlanta, Ga., Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms
Orders City’s Phased Reopening Plan to be Moved Back to Phase I (July 10, 2020),
https://www.atlantaga.gov/Home/Components/News/News/13408/672.
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Should Atlanta officials assert that they have the power to defy
the governor’s authority to impose statewide COVID-19 restrictions,
there is more than a century of consistent jurisprudence indicating
that the city will lose. It is not the purpose of this Article to question
the legal authority for a state’s imposition of less protective
measures on the residents of localities whose officials have opted to
err on the side of public health and safety. That authority is
longstanding and seemingly airtight. Instead, the Article proposes
a tactic that local government officials can employ to achieve a range
of strategies designed to enhance the public good, such as reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, protecting wildlife, eliminating pollution,
protecting the fragile coastal environment, enhancing workers’
wages and paid leave benefits, reducing gun-related violence,
providing more affordable housing units, and more. Indeed, the
example around which this Article is fashioned—an incentive-based
program for reducing the use of single-use plastic containers—seeks
to achieve several of these admirable and beneficial goals.
The Article will proceed as follows: Part I introduces a
practically insurmountable federal constitutional barrier to local
government autonomy—the principle that localities are mere
creations of the state. Part II highlights state laws enacted to negate
local laws designed to reduce or eliminate the use of single-use
plastic bags and other containers as a typical and disturbing
example of the “new preemption.” Professor Richard Briffault has
described this phenomenon as comprising “sweeping state laws that
clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar local
efforts to address a host of local problems.”6 Part III introduces the
idea of a purely local tax incentive as a solution for states closer to
red than blue on the ROYGBIV American political spectrum and
explains three advantages—moral, political, and constitutional—
that this tool has over outright bans, prohibitions, or orders. The
concluding section, Part IV, considers other settings in which a
similar tactic might work for the betterment of the public good, in
order to protect local initiatives within and far beyond the
environmental sustainability realm that have drawn negative
attention from state lawmakers who hold the awesome power to
preempt.

6. Richard Briffault, Essay, The Challenge of the New Federalism, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 1997 (2018).
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II. DON’T EVEN TRY:
THE INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LOCAL AUTONOMY
In 1907, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered a boatload of bad
news to champions of the notion of local autonomy as part of the
American polity. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,7 Justice Moody,
writing a concise opinion for a unanimous Court, rejected the
challenge brought by residents of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, who
objected to the wisdom and legality of a state-sanctioned
consolidation of their city with the larger city to the south—
Pittsburgh. Even though a majority of Allegheny voters rejected the
merger, a change in state law provided that a majority of the voters
in all affected areas would be sufficient (in this case, the voters of
the more populous and pro-consolidation Pittsburgh with their
hesitant potential mates to the north).
One of the key charges brought by Allegheny residents was “that
the Act of Assembly deprives the plaintiffs in error of their property
without due process of law, by subjecting it to the burden of the
additional taxation which would result from the consolidation.”8
Although the Court had yet to consider “[t]he precise question thus
presented” (by the voting scheme),9 Justice Moody dismissively
explained that “its solution by principles long settled and constantly
acted upon is not difficult.”10 Following a long list of citations, the
Court presented what was then and still is now the final word
regarding the paucity of local governments’ power against the states
that created (and could dissolve) them:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the
State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of
the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them. . . . The number, nature, and duration of the powers
conferred upon these corporations and the territory over
which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion
of the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring
governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used
for governmental purposes, or authorizing them to hold or
manage such property, or exempting them from taxation
upon it, constitutes a contract with the State within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at
7.
8.
9.
10.

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981761

Fall, 2020]

CHECK STATE

125

its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may
take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial
area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.
All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with
or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their
protest. In all these respects the State is supreme, and
its legislative body, conforming its action to the state
constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision
of the Constitution of the United States. Although the
inhabitants and property owners may by such changes suffer
inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value
by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason,
they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered
or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects
them from these injurious consequences. The power is in the
State, and those who legislate for the State are alone
responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.11
It was a fruitless endeavor for Allegheny residents to rely on the
city as a source of constitutional protection against the state creator.
Unlike many decisions issued by the Court in the early years of the
twentieth century,12 Hunter has stood the test of time.
In his recent rumination on the “new preemption,” Professor
Briffault provides this straightforward summary of the relative
status of localities and states:
The U.S. Constitution does not recognize local
governments, and the U.S. Supreme Court has long
treated local governments as essentially subdivisions of
their states, no more protected from state regulation or
displacement than the state’s department of motor vehicles.
In effect, federalism trumps any claim of localism. Local
governments have no constitutional rights against their

11. Id. at 178–79 (emphasis added).
12. Perhaps the best example of a contemporary decision that has not fared so well is
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Descriptions of this case quite often include the
adjective “notorious.” See, e.g., Stephen G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship
Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 235 (1996) (footnote omitted) (“The civic republicans liken the
courts’ approach in the speech cases to the notorious Lochner decision, in that the speech
cases require governmental neutrality and thereby reinforce the status quo.”). But see infra
notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
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states, and local residents have no federal constitutional
claim to the rights, powers, boundaries, or even the very
existence of their local governments.13
Regretfully for those who would like to see a power shift on
the state-local scale, the admirable scholarly attempts to challenge
Hunter’s vitality14 and to demonstrate that its impact has been
limited by subsequent decisions15 have not yet resonated with the
courts. The state’s authority to preempt—be it express or implied,
classic or new—the laws of its political subdivisions remains
inviolate on federal constitutional grounds.
The 21st century has witnessed preemption on steroids. The
unprecedented use of state legislation designed purposefully to
frustrate local experimentation is noteworthy and the subject
of concern and study. The table of contents for a helpful (and
troubling) compendium prepared by an interested party—the
National League of Cities (NLC)—includes information about state
stifling efforts under headings for “Minimum Wage, Paid Leave,
Anti-Discrimination, Sharing Economy, Municipal Broadband, Tax
and Expenditure Limitations, [and] Other Areas of Preemption.”16
Some, but certainly not all, of these examples reflect the tension
between pro-business or socially conservative Republicans in state
capitols versus their Democratic rivals to the left economically and
socially with power bases in central cities.17 This is particularly true
13. Briffault, supra note 6, at 2008 (footnotes omitted).
14. Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012). Morris’s agenda was an ambitious one:
On the doctrinal front, the Article offers two arguments. First, it argues that
Hunter’s federal rule of local governmental powerlessness vis-a-vis the states was
effectively overruled in 1938 by Erie v. Tomkins. Second, it argues that we should
not mourn the loss of Hunter because the rule of local powerlessness has always
stood on shaky analytical ground.
Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
15. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 563 (1999) (“Hunter’s seemingly unlimited holding is, however, more
confined than it appears.”).
16. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (NLC), CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATEBY-STATE ANALYSIS 2018 UPDATE (2008) (table of contents, page numbers omitted).
17. See, e.g., ALAN STONECIPHER & BEN WILCOX, PREEMPTION STRATEGY: THE ATTACK
ON HOME RULE IN FLORIDA 5–6 (Integrity Florida, Jan. 2020). According to this study:
Republican and conservative supporters of preemption have made clear that
preemption is a strategy rooted in partisan, ideological and urban-rural concerns.
One Florida legislator has predicted that preemption will accelerate because of “an
ideological battle developing between a conservative state Legislature and more
liberal urban centers.” A national group [the American Legislative Exchange
Council] says state preemption is justified because “local governments have become
victims of far left organizations manipulating the public and local officials.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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in the four subjects quickly discussed under the “Other Areas”
heading—state preemption of plastic bag bans, gun control,
nutritional labeling, and inclusionary zoning and rent control.18
If this movement seems somewhat contrived and purposeful,
well, it is, and there are two reasons why. The first is the
coordinated efforts of special interests (fossil fuel companies,
gun and ammunition manufacturers, retailers, and the like) to
employ lobbyists in order to influence state legislatures. The second
reason is that conservative special interests have at their disposal a
not-so-secret weapon—the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC). ALEC not only drafts and circulates model legislation; it
also coordinates effective lobbying efforts.19 ALEC’s record in
stimulating and following through with state legislative preemption
is impressive, and depressing for advocates of city power.20
With this powerful combination of constitutional toothlessness
and political vulnerability, what is a city to do if its officials want to
implement an initiative that will draw the ire of powerful special
interests and the politicians whom they influence through campaign
donations and other means? Before proposing an answer to this
tough question, we should spend some time on a specific example of
the new preemption at work.
III. A MIXED BAG:
STATE APPROACHES TO
LOCAL PLASTIC CONTAINER BANS
A textbook example of the “new preemption”—again, in
Professor Briffault’s words, “clearly, intentionally, extensively, and
at times punitively bar[ring] local efforts to address a host of local
problems“21—is state legislation that prevents local governments
from banning the use of plastic bags and other single-use containers.
ALEC has been far from passive in this area, as evidenced by its
18. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 16, at 23.
19. See Mike McIntire, Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2012, at A1 (noting that ALEC’s internal documents “offer a glimpse of how special
interests effectively turn ALEC’s lawmaker members into stealth lobbyists, providing them
with talking points, signaling how they should vote and collaborating on bills affecting
hundreds of issues like school vouchers and tobacco taxes.”).
20. See Henry Grabar, The Shackling of the American City, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2016, 5:53
AM), https://slate.com/business/2016/09/how-alec-acce-and-pre-emptions-laws-are-guttingthe-powers-of-american-cities.html (“ALEC has successfully pushed pre-emption into more
and more areas of GOP policy, from guns and tobacco to sanctuary cities, pesticides, and even
municipal broadband. The tactic has consumed state-level lawmaking as American political
life has become increasingly polarized between Republican-led statehouses . . . and Democratcontrolled cities . . . . Thanks in part to ALEC’s promotion of the concept, pre-emption has
become the most powerful statehouse tactic of our time.”).
21. See Briffault, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Model Resolution from 2015, “Regulating Containers to Protect
Business and Consumer Choice,”22 and by its Model Policy from
2018, the “Act to Establish Statewide Uniformity for Auxiliary
Container Regulations.”23
This preemption project has been a qualified success. As of early
2020 the majority of state legislatures have left it up to local
governments whether or not to ban, tax, or otherwise regulate
single-use plastic bags, according to the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL).24 However, for each of the seven
states whose legislatures have imposed bans on single-use plastic
bags, imposed a fee on the bags, or both (California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, New York, Oregon, and Vermont),25 there
were, as of the summer of 2020, at least two states that instead
flexed their preemption muscles (Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin), striking down dozens of existing and potential local
government bans.26 No fewer than eleven out of the states that have
22. Am. Legislative Exch. Council, Regulating Containers to Protect Business
and Consumer Choice, ALEC.ORG (2015), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/regulatingcontainers-to-protect-business-and-consumer-choice/ (“If the individual political subdivisions
of the state regulate such containers, there exists the potential for confusing and varying
regulations that could lead to unnecessary increased costs for retail and food establishments
to comply with such regulations.”).
23. Am. Legislative Exch. Council, Act to Establish Statewide Uniformity for Auxiliary
Container Regulations, ALEC.ORG (2018), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/act-to-establishstatewide-uniformity-for-auxiliary-container-regulations/ (designed “to preempt local
ordinances regulating the use, disposition, or sale of, prohibiting or restricting, or imposing
any fee, charge, or tax on certain containers”); See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 17-1-71 to -75
(2020).
24. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Plastic and Paper Bag Legislation,
NCSL.ORG
(Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-naturalresources/plastic-bag-legislation.aspx.
25. Id. Representative statutory provisions include CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42283(a)
(West 2020) (“Except as provided in subdivision (e) [regarding certain compostable bags that
may be sold to customers], on and after July 1, 2015, a store . . . shall not provide a single-use
carryout bag to a customer at the point of sale.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-246a(b)(1)
(West 2020) (“For the period commencing August 1, 2019, and ending June 30, 2021, each
store shall charge a fee of ten cents for each single-use checkout bag provided to a customer
at the point of sale.”); § 22a-246a(c) (“On and after July 1, 2021, no owner or operator of a
store shall provide or sell a single-use checkout bag to a customer.”); DEL. CODE tit. 7 §
6099A(b) (West 2020) (“The store which provides plastic bags for exemptions [from the
prohibition in (e) that are] listed in paragraph (e)(3) of this section below shall establish an
at-store recycling program pursuant to this section that permits a customer of the store to
return clean and dry plastic bags and film to the store.”); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 272805(1)(a) (Consol. 2020) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any
city and any county, other than a county wholly within such a city, acting through its local
legislative body, is hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend local laws,
ordinances or resolutions imposing a paper carryout bag reduction fee within the territorial
limits of such city or county, to take effect on or after March first, two thousand twenty.”).
26. NCSL, supra note 24. South Dakota joined the list after this publication appeared.
See S.D. COD. LAWS §§ 34A-6-61 and -92.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981761

Fall, 2020]

CHECK STATE

129

enacted “plastic ban bans” took their preemption language directly
out of the ALEC playbook, including South Dakota, which secured
passage and a gubernatorial signature in late February of 2020,
right before COVID-19 cast its wide shadow on legislative activities
throughout the nation.27
In those states that have flexed their preemption muscles
to stifle local government experimentation, there is little cities,
counties, and towns can do to challenge their “creators” in court
on constitutional or statutory grounds. The letter and spirit of
Hunter, even 113 years after its announcement by the Supreme
Court, are alive and well. There may, however, be a feasible
alternative for local government officials and residents who live
in states with uncooperative legislatures and who are not willing to
give up the fight to reduce pollution of oceans, other waterways, and
forests; to protect wildlife; to avoid overcapacity in landfills; and to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.28
IV. SKIN (AND A PRIVATE PARTNER)
IN THE GAME
Scholars, students, and practitioners of environmental law
are well aware of the classic paradigm that pits command-andcontrol versus market-based instruments. Tons of ink have
been spilt by lawyers, economists, and others in debating the
wisdom and efficiency of competing approaches for achieving
environmental protection and sustainability.29 A plastic bag ban is
a classic example of command and control—the targeted activity,
distribution of single-use plastic bags, is prohibited by law. Some
local governments have enacted a market-based solution by
charging customers a fee for each plastic bag they secure to take

27. 2020 S.S. SB 54, codified at S.D. COD. LAWS §§ 34A-6-61 and -92 (effective July 1,
2020). The four states that went their own way are Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, and
Missouri.
28. Courtney Lindwall, Single-Use Plastics 101, NRDC (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.
nrdc.org/stories/single-use-plastics-101?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-N2Y3fyx6gIVisDACh0lAg
HBEAAYASAAEgLghPD_BwE#why.
29. The legal literature alone on this topic is legion. See, e.g., David M. Driesen
and Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65,
66 (2009) (“After decades of experience in designing regulatory instruments to combat various
forms of environmental degradation, the discussion still largely revolves around a single
dimension of the problem: the choice between traditional regulation—often called ‘commandand-control’—and market-based mechanisms, like pollution taxes and emissions trading.”).
See also sources cited id. at note 1; W. Kip Viscusi et al., Discontinuous Behavioral Responses
to Recycling Laws and Plastic Water Bottle Deposits, 15 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 110, 139 (2013)
(“We find both water bottle deposits and recycling laws to be effective. Moreover, the strength
of effects for the recycling laws follows the degree of stringency of these measures.”).
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their goods out of the store or restaurant.30 As with carbon taxes,
the idea is to create a disincentive so that customers will alter their
behavior in order to avoid a direct cost.
Government can also incentivize positive behavior,31 which it
often does by granting tax incentives.32 Local governments collect
all sorts of taxes and fees, which vary from state to state and even
within the same state. For example, Alachua County, Florida
(population exceeding 260,000)33 imposes ad valorem real estate and
tangible personal property taxes and municipal public service
taxes,34 and collects assessments for purposes such as refuse
collection, solid waste management, fire services, and storm water.35
The county also levies a 1% surcharge on top of the state’s 6% sales
and use tax,36 a local option above the state’s fuel tax,37 a 5% “local
option transient rental tax,”38 and a surcharge above the state’s
“communications services tax.”39 The county’s fiscal year 2019-2020
30. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 8-102.03(a)(1) (“A consumer making a purchase from a retail
establishment shall pay at the time of purchase a fee of $.05 for each disposable carryout
bag.”).
31. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation:
A New Era for and Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991).
32. Early in his career, the author devoted much of his scholarship to state enterprise
zones, a set of tax and regulatory incentives designed to attract much-needed investment and
employment to many of the nation’s most economically distressed neighborhoods. See, e.g.,
Michael Allan Wolf, An “Essay in Re-Plan”: American Enterprise Zones in Practice, 21 URB.
LAWYER 29 (1989). For an example of a current list of state tax incentives for businesses,
see Tax Incentives for Businesses, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://floridarevenue.com/
taxes/taxesfees/Pages/tax_incentives.aspx.
33. FLA. OFFICE OF ECON.AND DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, FLORIDA
POPULATION ESTIMATES BY COUNTY AND MUNICIPALITY (Apr. 2019),
http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/population-demographics/data/2019_Pop_Estimates.pdf.
34. Municipal Public Service Tax Database, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE (Feb. 2020),
https://taxapps.floridarevenue.com/MPST/MPSTsearchResults.aspx (on electric, fuel oil, gas,
and water). Incorporated municipalities within the county impose their own taxes.
35. Property Taxes, ALACHUA CTY. TAX COLLECTOR (2019), https://www.
alachuacollector.com/property-taxes/; See also Property Tax Bill Guide, ALACHUA CTY. TAX
COLLECTOR (2019); https://www.alachuacollector.com/a-guide-to-your-2019-property-taxbill/.
36. Discretionary Sales Surtax, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://florida
revenue.com/taxes/taxesfees/Pages/discretionary.aspx; FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
DISCRETIONARY SALES SURTAX (2020), https://floridarevenue.com/Documents/dr15DSS
_%20r11_19.pdf.
37. Florida Fuel Tax, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://floridarevenue.com/
taxes/taxesfees/Pages/fuel.aspx;
https://floridarevenue.com/taxes/Documents/19B05-03_
chart.pdf.
38. FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, LOCAL OPTION TRANSIENT RENTAL TAX RATES
(2020), https://floridarevenue.com/Forms_library/current/dr15tdt.pdf (“[These taxes] include
the tourist development tax, convention development tax, tourist impact tax, and municipal
resort. The local tax imposed is in addition to the 6% state sales tax and any applicable
discretionary sales surtax.”).
39. This tax is imposed on “[c]able and satellite television,” “[v]ideo and music
streaming,” “[t]elephone,” and “[moble communications.” Florida Communications Services
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budget showed more than $471 million in total revenue, including
$150.4 million in ad valorem tax, $37.7 million in other taxes (sales
and use, utility services, communications services), and $37.9
million for “items such as permits, impact fees, and special
assessments on property.”40
Retailers play an important role in the county’s economy:
Walmart, listed among the “Top Ten Principal Taxpayers,” is
also included, along with Publix Supermarkets, as one of the
county’s “Top Ten Employers.”41 Not surprisingly, these two
companies alone paid several hundred thousands of dollars in ad
valorem real property taxes in 2019,42 not including the many
thousands of other dollars in taxes, fees, and revenues assessed by
the county. Local governments in Florida,43 and in several other
states,44 cannot implement a plastic bag ban. What if, instead of
banning or prohibiting outright the distribution to shoppers of
single-use plastic bags and containers, the county entered into
an agreement to reduce the local taxes of those retailers,
restaurants, and others who make the voluntary decision to stop
the distribution? Even if the tax incentive does not make up for
the increased costs attributable to the purchase of more expensive

Tax, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://floridarevenue.com/taxes/taxesfees/Pages/cst.aspx.
This surcharge can be imposed by unincorporated counties as well as incorporated cities and
other entities within counties. See Communications Services Tax Rate Table, , FLA. DEP’T
OF REVENUE (2020), https://pointmatch.floridarevenue.com/General/Communications
ServicesTaxRates.aspx.
40. ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, ADOPTED BUDGET FY 2019-2020, at 28–29.
41. Id. at 21.
42. A search of these public records can be performed here: ALACHUA CTY. TAX
COLLECTOR, https://alachua.county-taxes.com/public. (Search Publix Super Markets Inc,
then select each store individually; then search Wal-Mart and select each store individually).
43. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables, 282 So. 3d 889, 896 (Fla. Ct. App.
2019) (footnote omitted) (“Here, the statutes at issue are unambiguous; they expressly
preempt the City’s Polystyrene Ordinance. [Fla. Stat.] Section 403.708(9) preempts
regulatory control over ‘[t]he packaging of products manufactured or sold in the state. . . . .’
The plain text encompasses all types of packaging, including polystyrene. Similarly, section
403.7033 prohibits local governments from regulating ‘auxiliary containers.’ Again, the
‘polystyrene containers’ regulated by the City’s Ordinance are a type of ‘auxiliary container.’
Finally, section 500.90 specifically preempts the regulation of ‘polystyrene products.’”). Tom
Ankersen has cautioned the author that the broad wording of ALEC-based preemption
legislation such as FLA. STAT. § 403.7033 (2020) might even jeopardize certain tax incentives.
That wouild require a very expansive reading of the word “regarding” in the following
language: “[N]o local government, local governmental agency, . . . may enact any rule,
regulation, or ordinance regarding use, disposition, sale, prohibition, restriction, or tax of such
auxiliary containers, wrappings, or disposable plastic bags.”
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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paper bags, for example,45 there is always the chance that the new
non-plastic policy will attract some new customers.46
Sometimes the choice of a regulatory tool results not from
economic analyses but from political realities. Such is the case with
the alternative proposed here to state preemption of local plastic bag
bans and to a wide range of other local bans, prohibitions, and
orders within and well beyond the bounds of environmental and
energy law, such as gun control, living wage, and much, much more.
The political realities here are twofold. First, state lawmakers
who are themselves science skeptics, who perceive that their current
and potential electors are science skeptics and deniers, or both, hold
sway in many state legislatures.47 Second, with the spirit of Hunter
alive and well, local governments (even home rule municipalities),
regardless of their officials’ confidence in science, are considered
constitutionally powerless vis-à-vis the state that created (and has
the power to destroy) them.
Using financial incentives as a way of enlisting private partners
to achieve a regulatory goal—for example, the reduction of plastic
pollution—holds three advantages over an outright ban. The first
advantage is moral: because there is a real and readily measurable
cost to local government coffers in the form of foregone revenue from
taxes and fees, local officials will have real skin in the game. In other
words, for every dollar in tax and fee reductions granted to a local
retail business that provides the incentive sought by local
government officials (in this case a decision not to provide singleuse plastic bags and other containers to its customers), local officials

45. It is hard to get a handle on the exact cost difference between plastic and paper
grocery bags. One large national vendor’s advertised price for 12 x 7 x 17” paper bags was $57
per bundle of 300 ($.19 per bag) versus a price of $32 per carton of 1,000 for 12 x 7 x 22” clear
plastic bags ($.032 per bag). ULINE, https://www.uline.com/BL_5504/Grocery-Bags; ULINE,
https://www.uline.com/BL_5557/Plain-T-Shirt-Bags. See also WEBSTRAUNT STORE, https://
www.webstaurantstore.com/327/grocery-bags.html?filter=type:grocery-bags.
46. Even the same multi-state grocery chain will respond to local politics and consumer
desires. See Steve Contorno, Publix Embraces Plastic Bag Ban in South Carolina, So Why Not
in Florida?, TAMPA BAY TIMES BLOGS, Apr. 9, 2019 (contrasting the grocery company’s
compliance with a municipal ban in South Carolina with its opposition to lifting the
prohibition of local plastic bag bans in Florida).
47. See, e.g., Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Triumph of Climate-Change Denial
(Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/donald-trump-climatechange-skeptic-denial/510359/ (“Scientific evidence that human activity is the leading cause
of global warming has continued to accumulate in recent years, and the evidence for manmade climate change is now overwhelming. In spite of that, Republicans are slightly less
convinced than they were a decade and a half ago that the Earth is getting warmer as a result
of human activity. Democrats have moved in the opposite direction and become more likely
to say that man-made climate change is real. This year, Gallup found that while 85 percent
of Democrats believe human activity has led to higher temperatures, only 38 percent of
Republicans agree.”).
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will need either to raise taxes and fees or to cut budget allocations.48
No longer can critics portray the ban as a costless, quixotic effort by
inland lawmakers to save wildlife in the middle of a vast ocean. With
this tactic, money and mouth are, as they say in the real estate
business, co-located.
On the one hand, opponents can argue that it is easy and costfree for tree-hugging public officials in cities, counties, and towns
located far from oceans and other large water bodies to pass the cost
of a plastic bag ban (or, better yet, a tax on single-use containers) on
to others—a classic example of a negative externality. Professor
Stephen Carter, for example, in arguing against plastic bag bans,
has noted that “[i]t’s true that plastic pollution is literally
smothering life at the bottom of the seas. That pollution, however,
comes overwhelmingly from 10 rivers, none of which is located in
the Western Hemisphere.”49
On the other hand, the use of tax incentives will force local
officials to make a difficult choice among various ways to
compensate for the shortfall: (1) raise existing taxes or fees or
impose new ones, (2) cut current expenditures from existing
programs, or (3) a combination of 1 and 2. No matter the choice
officials make, they will run the real risk of alienating their
constituencies (that is, the voters). In other words, in exchange for
the public policy gain, elected officials will have to feel the pain.
The second advantage of offering a financial incentive to
businesses whose behavior local governments wish to push in a
positive direction—in this instance the elimination of plastic
pollution—is political in nature. The industry-funded lobbying
group that has taken the lead in encouraging state efforts to
preempt local plastic bag bans and taxes is the American Recyclable
Plastic Bag Alliance (formerly known by the misleading name,
American Progressive Bag Alliance).50 The Alliance, funded by
48. Part of the cost of the tax incentives may well be offset by solid waste disposal
savings.
49. Stephen L. Carter, Get Off the Bandwagon of Banning Plastic Bags, BLOOMBERG
OP. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-05/banning-singleuse-plastic-bags-won-t-save-our-oceans. The article linked to the word “overwhelmingly” in
Professor Carter’s piece reports that, despite its misleading title, “[a] recent study estimates
that more than a quarter of all that waste could be pouring in from just 10 rivers, eight of
them in Asia.” Prachi Patel, Stemming the Plastic Tide: 10 Rivers Contribute Most of the
Plastic in the Oceans, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/stemming-the-plastic-tide10-rivers-contribute-most-of-the-plastic-in-the-oceans/ (Feb. 1, 2018).
50. See https://bagalliance.org/ (“The Frontline Defense Against Plastic Bag Bans
and Taxes Nationwide”); DeAnne Toto, American Progressive Bag Alliance becomes
American Recyclable Plastic Bag Alliance, RECYLING TODAY (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.
recyclingtoday.com/article/american-progressive-bag-alliance-changes-name-setssustainability-goals/. The Plastics Industry Association, which has close ties to the Alliance,
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plastic bag manufacturers and recyclers, has a history of throwing
around big bucks to achieve its agenda.51 The Alliance also benefits
from some influential partners in helping to strike down local plastic
bag bans such as trade groups representing retailers, restaurants,
and lodging.52
Imagine that a local government employs the tactic of entering
into agreements with retailers to reduce local taxes in exchange
for eliminating the distribution of single-use plastic containers
to customers. Then lobbyists for businesses such as groceries,
department and specialty stores, and restaurants may either take a
pass on the issue at the state capitol or perhaps even advocate
that state lawmakers withhold their preemptive powers. The
manufacturers and recyclers who fund the Alliance would then
be on their own should they choose to oppose the public-private
incentive arrangement.
The final advantage of the incentive alternative to plastic
bag bans and taxes is constitutional in nature. Should local
governments’ and their retailer allies’ attempts to level the
lobbying playing field fall short, resulting in state preemption of
local, voluntary agreements between private retailers and local
governments, the resulting lawsuit might be captioned something
like Super Markets, Inc. and Center City v. State. (In many
preemption cases local officials find themselves on the receiving
end of service in connection with a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled
business or citizen against the local government that had the
chutzpah to defy state law.) Regardless of who files the suit
(or countersuit), however, the constitutional hegemony (with the
paucity of municipal rights) enshrined in Hunter v. Pittsburgh

lost two big players in 2019. Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Coke and Pepsi Abandon the Plastics
Lobby, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/30/business/coke-pepsi-plastics/index.html
(last updated Aug. 5, 2019, 5:35 PM).
51. See, e.g., Jeff Guo, A Plastic Bag Lobby Exists, and It’s Surprisingly Tough
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/03/a-plastic-baglobby-exists-and-its-surprisingly-tough/ (“The American Progressive Bag Alliance, which is
supported by major plastics manufacturers, spent over $3 million on consultants and a
petition management company between October and December, when it was collecting
signatures.”).
52. See, e.g., FRF Applauds Appeals Court Decision to Strike Down Coral Gables’
Polystyrene Ordinance, FLA. RETAIL FED’N, (Aug. 15, 2019), http://www.frf.org/index.php/
news/news-releases (“The Florida Retail Federation (FRF), the state’s premier trade
association supporting Florida’s retail industry for more than eighty years, applauds today’s
ruling by Miami’s 3rd District Court of Appeal. A victory for FRF and its members, the Court
struck down the City of Coral Gables’ effort to circumvent state law and restrict use of all
polystyrene products in the City.”). See also Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables, 282
So. 3d 889 (Fla. Ct. App. 2019) (finding state preemption of city’s polystyrene container ban).
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is irrelevant, and the plethora of constitutional rights that benefit
American corporations and other private business entities are
suddenly in play.53
Let us suppose that Center City, a home rule municipality, has
indeed granted tax incentives to Super Markets, because the
company has agreed to cease providing single-use plastic bags to
its customers. Influenced by lobbyists and motivated by their own
(or voters’) skepticism about the evils of plastic bags, the state
legislature preempts this kind of local tax incentive program. Center
City and Super Markets react to this legislation by bringing suit in
federal court against the state, alleging that as a home rule
municipality the city has the power to create this incentive program
and that the state statute has violated Super Markets’ rights under
the U.S. Constitution to substantive due process (Fourteenth
Amendment), equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment),
compensation for a regulatory taking (Fifth Amendment through
the Fourteenth Amendment), and to be free from the state’s
“impairing the Obligation of Contracts” (Contracts Clause).54 If the
plaintiffs find themselves before a federal district court judge who
is sympathetic to the anti-pollution and greenhouse gas emission
reduction goals of the incentive program, perhaps the court will rely
on the work of (former professor and now First Circuit Judge) David
Barron55 or others to distinguish this situation (a voluntary,
incentive-based program featuring private and public actors) from
the Hunter paradigm and thereby recognize the home rule city’s
authority. But what if the case is instead assigned to one of the
several dozen new judges appointed by a science- and climatechange skeptical President and his allies in the Senate majority?
In an intriguing plot twist, the oft-noted shift of federal trial and
appellate court appointments in a decidedly libertarian and

53. For the most controversial contemporary articulation of this principle, see Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), in which Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
explained: “The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to
corporations . . . The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’” Id. at 342–43 (citations omitted)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
55. See Barron, supra note 15 at 563–64 (noting that “Hunter’s positivist description of
local government power” was “necessarily incomplete,” in that “[i]t ignored the degree to
which local communities may provide the vital institutional context within which people live
their public lives in a constitutional democracy. A local community is not simply a type of
state administrative agency to be shaped at will to serve the need of the central state. It is,
in a fundamental sense, the locus for those human interactions that comprise what we
conceive to be democratic life in a constitutional system committed to self-government. So
understood, local governments are necessarily something more than the mere creatures of
state law, a point that the Hunter Court did not acknowledge.”).
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federalist direction during the Trump Administration56 could
actually and somewhat surprisingly enhance the chances that
local efforts to incentivize private section behavior, even behavior
that advances climate change resiliency and environmental
sustainability, will survive state preemption efforts.
Imagine now that the federal district judge who is assigned to
the case is one of the more than 140 such judges appointed by Trump
as of the summer of 2020.57 Law students over the past several
decades who paid attention in their basic constitutional law classes
are well aware that substantive due process and equal protection
challenges brought by corporations and other business entities
against run-of-the-mill economic regulation are subject to the
rational basis test (a test that governments at all levels find easy
to pass).58 There is a chance that Super Markets, Inc. and Center
City v. State will end up in the courtroom of a recently appointed
libertarian-leaning judge who, heeding recent calls by legal
academics59 and judges60 on the ideological right for judicial
56. See, e.g., Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration is Remaking the Courts,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 29, 2020, at 30. Zengerle notes, id. at 32, “The Federalist Society
for Law and Public Policy Studies, as it is officially known, has played a crucial role in putting
conservative jurists on the bench.” Even though many members are strong proponents of coequal sovereignty for state, the name “Federalist Society” is a bit misleading. According to
the organization’s web page,
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of conservatives
and libertarians interested in the current state of the legal order. It is founded on
the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of
governmental powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.
About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, https://fedsoc.org/about-us (last visited June 17, 2021)
(emphasis added).
57. Devon Cole & Ted Barrett, Senate confirms Trump’s 200th judicial nominee, CNN
(June 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/24/politics/trump-200-judicial-appointmentscory-wilson/index.html (“With the confirmation of Judge Cory Wilson to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Trump has successfully appointed 53 appeals court judges, 143 district
court judges, two US Court of International Trade judges and two Supreme Court justices—
Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh—according to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s
office.”).
58. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’n, 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.”).
59. For the best example of the recent reinvigoration of Lochner see DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Univ. of Chi. Press) (2011).
60. For a recent example of judges cozying up to Lochnerism, see Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of
Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 94 n.11 (2015) (Willett, J., concurring) (citations omitted)
(“The principal dissent dramatically—and predictably—accuses the Court of seeking to
unleash the ‘Lochner monster,’ trying to resurrect Lochner v. New York, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated on federal ‘liberty of contract’ grounds a state maximum-hours
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activism on behalf of economic freedom, has harbored the strong
suspicion that the Supreme Court was not necessarily incorrect in
Lochner v. New York61 when it invalidated a business regulation
that unconstitutionally interfered with “liberty of contract.”
Consider the following proposal for strengthening judicial
scrutiny in substantive due process cases, offered by Professor
Randy Barnett, one of the brightest legal academic candles in the
libertarian menorah, and Evan Bernick:
In this Article, we revisit the original meaning of the
text—the “letter”—of the Due Process of Law Clauses. We
then apply our model of good-faith construction based on
the clauses’ original functions—their “spirit”—of barring
arbitrary exercises of power over individuals. We contend
that the original letter and spirit of “due process of law”
in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require
legislatures to exercise their powers over the life, liberty, and
property of individuals in good faith by enacting legislation
that is actually calculated to achieve constitutionally proper
ends. Further, the original letter and spirit of “due process of
law” impose a duty upon both state and federal judges to
make good-faith determinations of whether legislation is
calculated to achieve constitutionally proper ends.62
Our neophyte jurist might relish the opportunity to put ideas
like these in play, striking down the state’s arbitrary and
unreasonable preemption of a voluntary contractual arrangement
entered into by a private company and a local government. This
scenario is not as farfetched as it might seem.
Even if our new judge resists the temptation to speak out in the
name of economic freedom, the Takings Clause provides an
alternative foundation for striking down the state preemption
statute. After all, if Super Markets had already been promised (or,
better yet, received) thousands of dollars in tax benefits, then
negation of the incentive arrangement would arguably amount to
a total taking of those dollars.63 Perhaps our new judge is
law for bakery workers. The Lochner bogeyman is a mirage but a ready broadside aimed at
those who apply rational basis rationally.”).
61. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
62. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of
the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599, 1605 (2019).
63. For the notion that the Takings Clause applies to governments who confiscate
money as well as real and tangible personal property, see Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 613 (2013) (“In this case, . . . the monetary obligation burdened
petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land. In that sense, this case bears resemblance
to our cases holding that the government must pay just compensation when it takes a lien—
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familiar with legal libertarian legend Professor Richard Epstein’s
influential, though highly criticized, “blueprint for takings
doctrine,“64 or has followed with admiration the work of the Pacific
Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm dedicated to protecting
individual liberty that has a long track record of bringing, and
supporting as an amicus, regulatory takings cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court.65
Should our new judicial appointee feel uncertain about
taking bold steps in the name of due process, equal protection,
and private property rights, there is another constitutional
provision that, upon simply reading the text, seems to apply to
the state’s abrogation of the agreement between Super Markets
and Center City. The Contracts Clause provides that “No State shall
. . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”66
Unfortunately for companies such as Super Markets, the Contracts
Clause has long been a nonstarter for private parties challenging
state interference with contracts and other agreements. This handsoff approach is best typified by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,67 a 1934 case in which
the majority upheld Minnesota’s Mortgage Moratorium Law, which,
not unlike similar foreclosure moratoria implemented during the
COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020,68 “provide[d] that,
during the emergency declared to exist, relief may be had through

a right to receive money that is secured by a particular piece of property.”). See also E. Enter.
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 555 (1998) (plurality) (“The Court has also made clear that the Clause
can apply to monetary interest generated from a fund into which a private individual has paid
money.”).
64. Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 509, 510 (1998) (“How then is
it that Epstein’s work is having such a widespread influence on the development of takings
law? What we found is a large and increasingly successful campaign by conservatives and
libertarians to use the federal judiciary to achieve an anti-regulatory, anti-environmental
agenda.”).
65. The PLF’s most recent victory in the High Court came in Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139
S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (holding that “the state-litigation requirement imposes an unjustifiable
burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence, and must be
overruled.”). Prevailing counsel was J. David Breemer. https://pacificlegal.org/staff/j-davidbreemer/. See James Pollack, Note, The Takings Project Revisited: A Critical Analysis of this
Expanding Threat to Environmental Law, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 235, 262–63 (2020)
(footnote omitted) (“Organizations like PLF thrive not only because they have a set of beliefs,
but also because they get cases in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. Their entire fundraising
model is premised on this fact. This is clear from their marketing that highlights “12 victories
and counting” at the Court, as well as from their website redesign meant to emphasize
Supreme Court cases in a way that spurred a large increase in donations.”).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
67. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
68. See Michael Allan Wolf, COVID-19 Pandemic and Real Property Law: An Early
Assessment of Relief Measures for Tenants and Residential Mortgagors, https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623281 (June 9, 2020).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3981761

Fall, 2020]

CHECK STATE

139

authorized judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosures of
mortgages, and execution sales, of real estate; that sales may be
postponed and periods of redemption may be extended.”69 Writing
for the bare majority of five Justices, Chief Justice Hughes
distinguished the application of constitutional provisions that are
“specific“ and “so particularized as not to admit of construction“
(such as the requirement that each state have two Senators)70 from
situations in which “constitutional grants and limitations of power
are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad outline, the
process of construction is essential to fill in the details.”71
In Blaisdell, the Contracts Clause fell into the latter category, to
the utter dismay of the four dissenters. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the conservative bloc on the Court, stated that “[h]e
simply closes his eyes to the necessary implications of the decision
who fails to see in it the potentiality of future gradual but everadvancing encroachments upon the sanctity of private and public
contracts.”72 In this opinion, Sutherland was singing the swan song
for a vigorous interpretation of the Contracts Clause.
But, wait, there is at least one current Justice who is not ready
to give up on the notion that judges should consider the words of
this weakened clause more substantively and consequentially. In a
2018 case, the Court upheld another Minnesota statute, this one
providing that “[i]f one spouse has made the other the beneficiary of
a life insurance policy or similar asset, their divorce automatically
revokes that designation—on the theory that the policyholder would
want that result.”73 Justice Gorsuch filed a strong dissent in which
he traced the winding path taken by the Court in interpreting the
Contracts Clause.
Gorsuch began his historical excursion by pointing out that the
Framers chose a categorical prohibition over “more nuanced limits
on state power.”74 While for several decades the Justices, for the
most part, acted in accordance with original understanding of the
Clause, “more recently,” Gorsuch wrote that, regretfully, “the Court
has charted a different course“ by “‘permit[ting] a state to

69. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state . . . .”).
71. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
72. Id. at 448 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
73. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1818 (2018) (citing MINN. Stat. §524.2-804, subd. 1
(2016)).
74. Id. at 1826 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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‘substantial[ly] impai[r]’ a contractual obligation in pursuit of ‘a
significant and legitimate public purpose’ so long as the impairment
is ‘reasonable.‘“75
At this point, Gorsuch provided a blueprint for our novice
judge and for other likeminded libertarians seeking to protect
contractual agreements from state interference:
That test seems hard to square with the Constitution’s
original public meaning. After all, the Constitution does
not speak of “substantial” impairments—it bars “any”
impairment. Under a balancing approach, too, how are the
people to know today whether their lawful contracts will
be enforced tomorrow, or instead undone by a legislative
majority with different sympathies? Should we worry that a
balancing test risks investing judges with discretion to
choose which contracts to enforce—a discretion that might
be exercised with an eye to the identity (and popularity) of
the parties or contracts at hand? How are judges supposed to
balance the often radically incommensurate goods found in
contracts and legislation? And does this test risk reducing
the “Contract Clause’s protection” to the “Court’s judgment”
about the “‘reasonableness’“ of the legislation at hand?76
As a special bonus, Gorsuch pointed interested lawyers
and judges to the work of “[m]any critics [who] have raised
serious objections along these and other lines”77 and
suggested that those critics “deserve a thoughtful reply, if
not in this case then in another.”78
There is certainly no guarantee (or even a high
likelihood) that any federal district court judge, new or
longstanding, will jump at the opportunity to endorse the
theories discussed in the paragraphs above in support of
economic liberty. Nevertheless, counsel who would be
defending the incentive approach from state preemption

75. Id. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan.
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–412 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 1827–28 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (quoting City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379
U.S. 497, 529 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)).
77. Id. at 1828 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing, among other sources, JAMES W. ELY,
JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 7–29 (2016), and Richard A.
Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705–17
(1984)).
78. Id.
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would be wise to prepare arguments along these lines as
part of their litigation arsenal, if only to preserve these
constitutional claims for appeal.
It is at the federal appellate level that the odds of Super
Markets and Center City prevailing over the preemptive
state should increase dramatically, as roughly 30% (53) of
the 179 seats on U.S. courts of appeal were held by Trump
appointees as of the summer of 2020.79 They joined forty-five
of the judges already sitting on those courts who were
appointed by Republican Presidents.80 Basic math (and
voting patterns that correlate with the party of the President
making the appointment)81 should teach counsel that
nearly all appellate court judges will be interested to hear
arguments either (1) supporting a local government’s
authority to craft a responsive, incentive-based antipollution measure designed to survive a state preemption
effort, or (2) advancing solid conservative and libertarian
values such as economic liberty, property rights, and
contract rights.
The goal of a litigator, it must always be remembered, is
to prevail in the instant case, which means to get at least two
appellate court votes invaliding the preemption attempt out
of three. Many local government and environmental
attorneys will not find the latter set of arguments to be
persuasive, appealing, and consistent with their personal
beliefs. As I have suggested elsewhere in a related context,
“sustainability advocates need to keep their eye on the
prize—winning the case so that government officials
can continue to respond creatively and effectively
to the causes and impacts of climate change—even if it
means holding their noses while drafting their briefs and
delivering oral arguments.”82 The legal landscape in federal
courts has been reshaped and redrawn by one party
determined to leave its ideological imprint on the judicial

79. JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS UPDATE (June 24, 2020), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/
policy-papers/judicial-confirmations-update.
80. JUDGESHIP APPOINTMENTS BY PRESIDENT (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/apptsbypres.pdf.
81. For a sampling of this extensive literature and critiques thereof, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2017 (2016).
82. Michael Allan Wolf, Right Environmentalism: Repurposing Conservative
Constitutionalism, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 663 (2018).
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branch, casting to the dust heap of history Senate traditions
such as the blue slip and cutting off floor debate on
nominees.83 To close one’s eyes and hope that this situation
(like a certain deadly virus) suddenly disappears, or to
continue to push arguments that are an anathema to a wide
swath of the judiciary are both foolhardy choices.
V. CHECKING STATE PREEMPTION IN
OTHER SETTINGS
Local government officials throughout the nation are seeking to
improve the health and safety of their citizens, to protect fragile
ecosystems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to ensure living
wages and improve conditions of employment, to enhance the supply
of affordable housing, and to provide other important amenities.
These officials increasingly find themselves stymied and frustrated
by state legislatures, often dominated by members of the opposing
party, who are eager to pull the preemption trigger. Only a fool
would claim to be certain about future partisan alignments in state
capitols even just a few years from now. Still, there is no indication
that the “new preemption” is just a problem when Republicans
control state legislatures. After all, as the decisions by each party to
employ the “nuclear option“ for federal judicial appointments make
clear,84 what is sauce for the goose is inevitably sauce for the gander.
Because there is no indication on the horizon that the current
Court is eager to depart from more than a century of prior practice
by recognizing some form of city autonomy, and because the stakes
can be very high (as in the struggle between Georgia’s governor and
Atlanta’s mayor over COVID-19 measures85), experimenting with
incentives as alternatives to bans and prohibitions makes sense in
practical, political, and constitutional terms. Not unlike retailers
and restaurants that agree to substitute paper for plastic bags and
containers, businesses that pay all full-time employees a living wage
or who expand their leave benefits could be rewarded with tax and

83. Judicial Vacancies, A.B.A, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_
legislative_work/priorities_policy/independence_of_the_judiciary/judicial_vacancies/ (Oct. 1,
2020).
84. See, e.g., Andrew Duehren, “Nuclear Option” Adopted, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2019, at
A5 (“Senate Republicans invoked the so-called nuclear option to use a simple majority to
change the chamber’s rules for confirming many appointees to the executive and judicial
branches. . . . In 2013, then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Democrat, implemented a
temporary set of procedural changes similar to the ones Republicans permanently enacted on
Wednesday.”).
85. See supra note 5.
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fee incentives,86 as could developers who set aside affordable units,87
gun shop and firing range owners who agree to locate only in
industrial zones,88 and beachfront landowners who promise to
rebuild at their own expense sand dunes that are destroyed by
storms or erosion.89 Indeed, in any area of municipal regulation in
which local officials believe that there is a high risk of state
legislative preemption, the use of incentives should be considered
as a sound alternative to outright bans, prohibitions, and orders.
The resulting public-private partnership, cemented by valuable
concessions, will ensure that local governments bear their fair share
of the costs of implementing regulations; help level the lobbying
playing field in state legislatures that are considering preemption;
and, should the state attempt to invalidate the partnership, provide
ample rationale for a judicial response that is receptive to local
needs, protective of private rights, and in support of the common
good.

86. Cf. NLC, supra note 16, at 6–8 (noting that, as of 2018, twenty-eight states had in
some fashion preempted local minimum wage provisions, and twenty-three had preempted
local paid leave provisions).
87. Cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-461.16 (2016) (“[A] city or town shall not adopt a land use
regulation or general or specific plan provision, or impose as a condition for approving a
building or use permit, a requirement or fee that has the effect of establishing the sales or
lease price for a residential housing unit or residential dwelling lot or parcel or that requires
a residential housing unit or residential dwelling lot or parcel to be designated for sale or
lease to any particular class or group of residents.”).
88. Cf. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) (invalidating “(1) a zoning
restriction allowing gun ranges only as special uses in manufacturing districts; [and] (2) a
zoning restriction prohibiting gun ranges within 100 feet of another range or within 500 feet
of a residential district, school, place of worship, and multiple other uses . . . . “).
89. Cf. Suzanne P. Sutherland, Note, Revision of Michigan’s Sand Dune Protection and
Management Act Benefits Private Interests at the Expense of Local Zoning Regulations, 59
WAYNE L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2014) (noting that 2012 legislation imposed “a greater degree of
state preemption of local zoning ordinances.”). See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.35312(2)
(“A zoning ordinance . . . shall not be more restrictive than the model zoning plan or the
standard of review for permits or variances prescribed in the model zoning plan.”).
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